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  Abstract 
We investigate the impact of wage comparisons for worker productivity. We present three 
studies which all use three-person gift-exchange experiments. Consistent with Akerlof and 
Yellen's (1990) fair wage-effort hypothesis we find that disadvantageous wage discrimination 
leads to lower efforts while advantageous wage discrimination does not increase efforts on 
average. Two studies allow us to measure wage comparison effects at the individual level. 
We observe strongly heterogeneous wage comparison effects. We also find that reactions 
to wage discrimination can be attributed to the underlying intentions of discrimination rather 
than to payoff consequences. 
Keywords 
fair wage-effort hypothesis, wage comparison, gift exchange, horizontal fairness, 
discrimination 
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I. Introduction 
In a concept coined ‘fair wage effort hypothesis’, Akerlof and Yellen (1990) stress the 
importance of fairness considerations for workers’ effort choices. In labor relations where 
effort  is  not  perfectly  contractible  workers’  performance  might  depend  on  the  perceived 
fairness of their salary. The core assumption of the fair wage effort hypothesis is that workers 
compare their wage w to the fair wage w*. Effort is assumed to be increasing in w as long as a 
worker’s wage falls short of w*; wage increases beyond w* do not increase effort further. In 
this paper, we investigate this hypothesis experimentally, using a three person gift exchange 
game as our work horse.  
There  is  by  now  a  large  body  of  experimental  evidence  showing  the  importance  of 
reciprocity in social exchange situations. Starting with Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993), 
the literature on gift exchange experiments shows that on average the effort of experimental 
workers  increases  in  the  generosity  of  the  wage  offered  by  the  employer.
1  The  existing 
experimental  literature  focuses  largely  on  bilateral  relations  between  an  employer  and  a 
worker, or, in other words, on a ‘vertical’ comparison within a firm's hierarchy. Especially in 
real workplaces, however, it is most likely that Akerlof and Yellen’s “fair wage” is to a large 
degree determined by ‘horizontal’ comparisons among employees. It is likely that people take 
their peers, that is, co workers who are comparable to them, as reference group for social 
comparisons (e.g., Falk and Knell (2004); Clark and Senik (2009)). If social comparisons are 
important for work morale, internal pay structures (including wages, fringe benefits, and other 
perks) are important for performance. In the words of Bewley (1999) who interviewed more 
than 300 personnel managers: “The main function of internal structure is to ensure internal 
pay equity, which is critical for good morale” (p. 82).
2 
In this paper we investigate these morale effects experimentally. We concentrate on wage 
effects and use a three person gift exchange game (one employer, two employees) to measure 
the influence of wage differences on efforts. As common in gift exchange experiments, effort 
is  costly  for  employees  but  higher  efforts  increase  total  welfare.  We  are  in  particular 
interested in observing ei(wi, wj), where ei denotes worker i’s effort as a function of his or her 
own wage and the wage of a co worker. From previous experiments we predict that ∆ei/∆wi > 
0,  that  is,  on  average  employees  react  reciprocally  to  their  own  wage  (despite  material 
incentives to choose minimal effort irrespective of wages). The three person gift exchange 
experiment allows a direct measurement of ∆ei/∆wj, that is, wage comparison effects – the 
average  reaction  of  a  worker's  effort  to  an  observed  change  in  the  co worker's  wage.  Of 
particular interest for us are situations of “pure” pay inequity, that is, inequitable situations 
that are not justified by situational differences, or differences in performance or merit, which 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1997); Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1998); Fehr, Kirchler, 
Weichbold and Gächter (1998); Fehr and Falk (1999); Hannan, Kagel and Moser (2002); Brandts and Charness 
(2004); Charness, Frechette and Kagel (2004) and Charness (2004). For gift exchange games with more than one 
employee see Maximiano, Sloof and Sonnemans (2007). 
2 See Campbell and Kamlani (1997) and Agell and Bennmarker (2007) for similar findings. Pfeffer and Langton 
(1993)  and  Clark  and  Oswald  (1996)  show  that  there  is  a  significantly  positive  connection  between  an 
employee’s  relative  income  and  job  satisfaction.  Loewenstein,  Thompson  and  Bazerman  (1989)  provide  a 
psychological account of inequality in social comparisons.   
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equity theory (e.g., Adams (1965); Selten (1978); Güth (1994); Konow (2000)) would predict 
are acceptable. In the cases we study, unequal pay is simply wage discrimination.  
For answering our research question we planned three studies. In Study 1 we use three 
person gift exchange games played in the usual sequential (direct response) mode. We repeat 
the basic three person gift exchange game eight times and randomly re match groups of three 
players in each round. This is the simplest extension of the two player game to allow for wage 
comparison effects. On average our experimental evidence supports Akerlof and Yellen's fair 
wage effort  hypothesis,  if  we  assume  that  a  worker  takes  the  co worker's  wage  as  the 
reference wage. This assumption is plausible because in our experiment workers are identical, 
act in identical decision situations, and only receive information about their own and their 
current  co worker’s  wage.  We  find  that  experimental  workers  who  face  disadvantageous 
wage discrimination (that is, who are paid less than their colleague) significantly reduce their 
effort relative to a situation with equal wages.  
In Study 1 we focus on average wage comparison. In Study 2 we focus on individual 
differences in wage comparison. Heterogeneity is ex ante plausible in our environment, given 
what we know from previous research on social preferences (see, e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher 
(2002);  Camerer  and  Fehr  (2006);  and  Gächter  and  Thöni  (2007)  for  surveys).  Study  2 
investigates individual heterogeneity by using the strategy method to elicit effort reactions 
given all possible wage combinations. This has the advantage that we can elicit ei(wi, wj) for 
each individual and all possible wage combinations, not just those that happen to arise under 
the direct response mode. The results show that the average effort reaction is again consistent 
with the fair wage effort hypothesis. Yet, the average masks a large degree of heterogeneity. 
We observe a large variety of wage comparison patterns and provide a classification. 
Finally, Study 3 explores whether wage comparison effects are due to intentional wage 
discrimination or due to payoff differences. This question is interesting, given recent evidence 
that fairness concerns are strongly influenced by perceived intentions (e.g., Falk, Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2008)). To test for the role of intentions we conduct an experiment where a 
random device chooses the wages. Thus, employers are not responsible for discriminatory 
wage arrangements. We find that the employer's intention to discriminate wages rather than 
mere payoff consequences triggers the wage comparison effects. 
We  see  our  experimental  approach  as  complementary  to  other,  more  conventional 
empirical  methods.  The  existing  empirical  studies  paint  a  mixed  picture  about  the 
consequences of wage inequality.
3 We use laboratory experiments to cleanly isolate wage 
comparison  effects  from  other  confounding  factors  such  as  differential  productivities  and 
abilities.  Our  design  allows  us  to  observe  morale  effects  directly.
4  Moreover,  if  wage 
comparison  effects  are  behaviorally  important  and  can  have  negative  morale  effects  as 
                                                 
3  Some  studies  find  that  internal  pay  dispersion  is  detrimental  for  work  morale  and  job  performance  (e.g. 
Cowherd and Levine (1992); Pfeffer and Langton (1993); Grund and Westergaard Nielsen (2008); and Martins 
(2008)), others fail to find that pay dispersion has any effect on employees’ behavior (e.g. Leonard (1990)), and 
some studies even find that large pay differentials may have beneficial effects on firm performance (e.g. Main, 
O'Reilly and Wade (1993); Eriksson (1999); Winter Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999); and Hibbs and Locking 
(2000)). 
4 For a neuro economic study on social comparisons that uses a similar methodology see Fliessbach, Weber, 
Trautner, Dohmen, Sunde, Elger and Falk (2007).  
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suggested by Bewley’s quote, we might not be able to observe wage comparison effects easily 
in the field because naturally occurring wage structures are already designed to avoid negative 
morale effects. Thus, experiments allow us to investigate the counterfactual, which helps us to 
understand the importance of internal wage structures.  
Our paper contributes to a nascent experimental literature on pay comparison effects.
5 An 
early paper is Güth, Königstein, Kovács and Zala Mezõ (2001). They investigate a trilateral 
principal agent game where the two workers differ in productivity. The principal offers two 
separate  contracts  to  the  two  workers.  The  treatment  variable  is  the  information  workers 
receive about the contract of the other worker. The results show that contractual conditions 
are less asymmetric when workers can observe each others’ contracts. Cabrales and Charness 
(2000) get a comparable result in a framework with asymmetric information (the principal 
does not know the type of his two agents). Our paper differs from these studies because our 
focus is not on contract design but on the agents’ behavior. Charness and Kuhn (2007) lies 
closer to our goals. In contrast to Güth, et al. (2001) they ran three person gift exchange 
games where experimental workers differ in their productivities. They do not find systematic 
wage  comparison  effects.
6  Clark,  Masclet  and  Villeval  (forthcoming)  study  bilateral  gift 
exchange games where workers learn the attractiveness of their work contract relative to other 
contracts in the market. They show that the rank of the own wage within the wages in the 
observed  contracts  significantly  influences  efforts.  Abeler,  Altmann,  Kube  and  Wibral 
(forthcoming) look at a situation in which equality can also be unfair. To achieve this, they 
change the order of moves: Agents first choose their efforts and the principal then decides (in 
one treatment) whether to pay equal or unequal wages (in a control treatment the principal is 
forced to pay equal wages). The results support equity theory, which in their case, often 
predicts unequal wages due to unequal effort. 
Our study differs in two important aspects from all previous studies. Firstly, in our setup 
workers are ex ante in identical positions because they do not differ in their productivity at the 
time wages are set. Secondly, we are interested in individual heterogeneity and therefore offer 
two further experiments that allow us to discuss inter individual differences.  
 
II. Design and procedures 
This section sets out the basic structure of the three person gift exchange game that is 
common to all three studies, which we describe in detail in sections III to V. In order to study 
the effect of wage comparisons among workers we adapt the standard bilateral gift exchange 
game (Fehr, et al. (1993)). In particular, we study a three person gift exchange game in which 
                                                 
5 A related literature using the gift exchange game or similar games is on ‘social interaction effects’, that is, how 
the mere observation of others’ behaviors influences own decisions. See Gächter, Nosenzo and Sefton (2008), 
Thöni and Gächter (2009) and Mittone and Ploner (2009). For studies on social comparison effects using the 
ultimatum game see, e.g., Knez and Camerer (1995); Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) and Alewell and Nicklisch 
(2009).  
6 Hennig Schmidt, Rockenbach and Sadrieh (forthcoming) found neither an own wage nor a wage comparison 
effect  in  their  field  experiment.  Subsequent  laboratory  experiments  (which  only  controlled  for  own  wage 
changes) revealed that the likely reason for the lack of an own wage effect was that subjects in their field 
experiment did not receive any surplus information. Hence, attributions of fair or unfair treatment were hardly 
possible.   
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an employer is matched with two workers. The game proceeds as follows. First, the employer 
chooses  two  wages  wi  and  wj  for  worker  i  and  worker  j,  respectively.  The  employer  is 
restricted to three wage levels – 10, 100, or 200 ECU (experimental currency units). The 
workers learn both wages and choose their effort  { } , 1,2,...,20 i j e e ∈  simultaneously. This 
concludes the game and earnings are calculated. The employer’s income is 
  ( ) 18 E i j i j e e w w π = + − − .  (1) 
We restrict the employers’ choice to three wage levels to reduce the complexity in wage 
comparisons. Three wage levels are sufficient to study effort choices in situations where the 
co worker earns less, the same, or more. The production function is additively separable, that 
is, the two employees’ efforts are perfect substitutes for the firm. We have chosen this simple 
way of aggregating the two efforts to total output deliberately since we want to examine the 
workers’ wage effort functions in a situation where the workers differ only with respect to the 
wage they receive. 
The income of a worker i is given as 
  ( ) 7( 1) i i i i i w c e w e π = − = − − .  (2) 
Worker j’s income is calculated according to the exact same payoff function. The workers 
receive their wage and have to bear the costs of their own effort. For ease of understanding 
costs are linear in effort and minimal effort is costless. The marginal product of effort is 
always higher than marginal cost which makes full effort the surplus maximizing solution. 
Solving  the  three person  gift  exchange  game  under  standard  assumptions  results  in 
minimal  efforts  and  wages  and  thus  predicts  the  absence  of  wage  comparison  effects. 
Introducing  social  preferences  produces  a  large  variety  of  possible  patterns  (see  Thöni 
(2009)). This paper does not aim to test theories of social preferences but is designed to 
produce empirical facts about reactions to wage inequality in a stylized environment. 
We  ran  all  experiments  in  a  computerized  laboratory  at  the  University  of  St.  Gallen 
(Switzerland) using z Tree (Fischbacher (2007)); and we used ORSEE (Greiner (2004)) for 
recruitment. Our data for the three studies covers a total of 544 subjects. Subjects were first 
year students with no prior experience in gift exchange games. Upon arrival the subjects were 
allocated at random to the computer terminals. The experimental instructions explained the 
rules of the experiment in detail (see appendix). The subjects had to do several exercises to 
prove their understanding of the task. The experiment did not start before all subjects had 
answered all questions correctly. During the exercises and also when taking decisions subjects 
had access to a ‘What if calculator’. This tool allowed calculating the payoff consequences 
for hypothetical values for w1, w2, e1, and e2. Before the experiment started, every subject had 
to calculate the three players’ incomes for four exemplary wage and effort combinations. This 
procedure ensures familiarity with the ‘What if calculator’. The participants used the ‘What 
if calculator’ frequently. On average they did 22 (σ = 16) calculations during the experiment. 
As  in  previous  gift  exchange  experiments  (e.g.,  Fehr,  et  al.  (1997))  we  presented  the 
experiment in  a  ‘buyer seller’  frame, where  buyers  first  choose  two  prices and  the  seller 
chooses the quality level of product, which we deem to be more neutral with regard to our 
research question than a labor relations frame.   
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Note from the payoff functions (1) and (2) that both the workers and the employer can 
take losses. In order to prevent overall losses, all subjects received a fixed payment of 400 
ECU at the beginning of the experiment. For the sessions with several rounds subjects were 
paid for one randomly selected round. Subjects earned on average € 9 in this experiment. The 
experiments in Study 1 lasted about an hour; in Study 2 and Study 3 about half an hour. 
 
III. Study 1: The importance of wage comparison effects 
For  Study  1  we  conducted  three  experimental  sessions  with  36  subjects  each.  This 
provides us with observations from 108 subjects, 36 employers and 72 workers. We repeat the 
game described in the previous section for eight rounds keeping roles constant and using a 
random matching protocol within matching groups of twelve subjects (that is, groups of three 
are  randomly  reformed  each  period).  We  applied  random  matching  to  minimize  strategic 
effects. The three sessions provide us with nine independent observations and a total of 8×72 
= 576 effort choices. At the end of each round the employer is informed about the efforts of 
both employees. Each employee is, however, only informed about her own payoff, which 
minimizes potential confounding interaction effects among the two workers. 
Results 
The employers in our experiment paid on average a wage of 63 ECU. In 44 percent of the 
cases they offered the lowest possible wage combination (10;10); more generous symmetrical 
wage offers occurred in 19 percent of the cases with (100;100) and 8 percent of the cases at 
(200;200). Asymmetric wage combinations occurred in 18 percent of the cases for (10;100 or 
vice versa); in 6 percent for (10;200); and in 5 percent for (100;200). Asymmetric wage 
combinations were quite frequent. More than half of all wage offers (52 percent) with at least 
one non minimal wage contained asymmetric wages.  
On average, the employees reacted reciprocally towards increases in their own wage. At 
the lowest wage the average effort was 1.37, at the intermediate wage 4.75 and at the highest 
wage 6.58. A minority of 19.4 percent of the workers chose the minimal effort in all eight 
rounds of the experiment. When paid the minimal wage, most of the workers (72 percent) 
always chose the minimal effort. These observations are consistent with a host of previous 
gift exchange experiments (see footnote 1).  
Figure 1 shows the average effort for all nine wage combinations. Connected points show 
wage comparison effects, that is, the average efforts for a given own wage and for different 
co worker’s  wages.  Numbers  indicate  the  number  of  observations  for  a  given  wage 
combination. 
The wage comparison effects observed in this experiment do not seem to follow a clear 
pattern. At the minimum wage employees tend to increase their effort when the co worker is 
paid a non minimal wage. At the maximum wage employees tend to do the opposite, namely 
decrease their effort when the co worker’s wage increases. The intermediate own wage of 100 
is the most interesting one for comparison effects. Here we can observe the reaction to both 
advantageous and disadvantageous wage inequality. Earning more than the co worker does  
  8 
not seem to affect efforts, while earning less than the co worker leads to a substantial drop in 
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Figure 1: Average efforts for all nine combinations of the own wage 
and the other employee’s wage. Numbers indicate the number of 
observations for a given wage combination. 
 
The question is whether these wage comparison effects are systematic. We use random 
effects estimates to check for significant wage comparison effects, controlling for time effects 
and individual heterogeneity. We include wage variation by two dummies indicating the low 
and high wage, with the intermediate wage as omitted case. The first model in Table 1 shows 
that  efforts  are  significantly  increasing  in  the  worker’s  own  wage.  We  add  two  similar 
dummies for the other worker’s wage. The dummy for wj = 10 is small and insignificant, on 
the other hand, the dummy for wj = 200 is much larger and just about 10 percent significant 
(p = .099). The coefficient is negative, which means that employees tend to reduce their effort 
for a ceteris paribus increase of the co worker's wage from 100 to 200. The estimate does not 
change if we include period effects (second model).  
We apply additional estimates to investigate separate wage comparison effects in case a 
worker is paid the low, intermediate or high wage. The remaining three models in Table 1 
show the results of random effects models for each of the three levels of a worker’s own 
wage. These estimates correspond to a set of three line connected dots in Figure 1. The wage 
comparison effect at wi = 100 for a high co worker's wage is now highly significant. Workers 
do reduce their effort when they are paid less than their co worker. Note that this is basically 
the only comparison that allows to measure employees' reactions to disadvantageous wage 
inequality,  because  in  the  situations  with  wi = 10  efforts  are  so  low  that  most  employees 
cannot react to changes in wj. So the reaction to disadvantageous wage inequality shown in 
Figure 1 is highly significant when we control for period effects and individual heterogeneity.  
  9 
This is not the case for the pronounced drop at wi = 200, which remains insignificant in our 
estimates. 
 
   Random effects GLS  
   All obs  wi=10  wi=100  wi=200 
wi=10   3.675**   3.553**       
  (0.449)  (0.436)       
wi =200  2.474**  2.505**       
  (0.723)  (0.745)       
wj=10  0.005  0.123   0.667  0.316  2.203 
  (0.389)  (0.411)  (0.404)  (0.299)  (1.570) 
wj=200   0.695   0.665   0.271   1.225**  0.291 
  (0.421)  (0.405)  (0.411)  (0.393)  (0.981) 
Period     0.106*   0.060   0.153   0.251 
    (0.046)  (0.049)  (0.099)  (0.215) 
Constant  4.919**  5.253**  2.209**  5.447**  7.046** 
  (0.271)  (0.354)  (0.472)  (0.432)  (1.366) 
prop> χ
2  0.000  0.000  0.125  0.005  0.079 
N  576  576  323  175  78 
Table  1:  Random  effects  GLS  estimates  for  the  effort  choice,  all 
observations  and  for  the  three  levels  of  a  worker  i’s  wage.  In 
parentheses:  robust  standard  errors  clustered  on  matching  group;  * 
denotes significance at 5 percent, ** at 1 percent. The intermediate 
wages are the omitted cases.  
 
Discussion 
It is interesting to contrast our findings with those of Charness and Kuhn (2007) who also 
found a strong own wage effect but little evidence for wage comparison effects. We find clear 
support  for  the  importance  of  wage  comparison  in  the  domain  of  disadvantageous  wage 
inequality.
7  The  results  for  wi = 100  fit  perfectly  to  the  asymmetric  pattern  proposed  by 
Akerlof  and  Yellen  (1990),  if  we  assume  that  the  other  worker's  wage  determines  the 
reference wage. At wi = 200, where we only observe advantageous wage inequality, we cannot 
find systematic wage comparison effects. 
While we allow for individual heterogeneity in efforts in our estimates, we still measure 
an average reaction to wage changes. However, it might well be the case that also these 
reactions to wage changes differ systematically across individuals.
8 Furthermore, wage offers, 
and therefore also wage inequality, arise endogenously in this experiment, which implies that 
                                                 
7 One reason for the difference between Charness and Kuhn and our results might be the fact that in their 
experiment workers differed in productivity. A setup with asymmetric workers makes the interpretation of wage 
discrimination more difficult and thus lead to more variance in the behavioural reactions. 
8 Given the literature on heterogeneity with regard to reciprocal behaviour, one should also expect heterogeneity 
with  regard  to  wage  comparisons.  The  best  explored  area  of  individual  heterogeneity  is  public  goods 
experiments  conducted  with  the  strategy  method.  In  these  experiments  subjects  indicate  how  much  they 
contribute as a function of others’ contribution. The result is great heterogeneity: Some are free rider types, 
whereas others reciprocate others’ contributions. See, e.g., Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001); Fischbacher 
and  Gächter  (forthcoming);  Herrmann  and  Thöni  (2009);  Kocher,  Cherry,  Kroll,  Netzer  and  Sutter  (2008); 
Muller, Sefton, Steinberg and Vesterlund (2008) and Thöni, Tyran and Wengström (2009). For an experiment 
using the strategy method in the gift exchange game see Gächter, et al. (2008).  
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some wage combinations are quite rare and therefore individual reactions to different wage 
combinations  are  only  observed  infrequently  and  unequally  across  cells.  Running  the 
experiment for more rounds does not solve the problem because it might induce strategic 
confounds (due to unavoidable re matchings) and still does not guarantee the collection of a 
sufficient number of observations in all the different wage combinations for all employees. In 
Study 2 we therefore replicate our three person gift exchange game using the strategy method 
for the workers' effort decision. This will allow us to observe ei(wi, wj) for each individual, 
and not just some average e(wi, wj). 
 
IV. Study 2: The role of individual heterogeneity in wage comparison effects 
We use the exact same experimental game as in Study 1 with the exception that we elicit 
workers’ efforts by a variant of the strategy method (Selten (1967)). Like in the previous 
study employers decide on the wages but workers in this study choose their effort before they 
know the wages.  Specifically, all workers have to fill in a 3×3 matrix to indicate an effort 
decision for every possible combination of their own wage and the wage of their co worker. 
This information allows us to isolate the marginal effects of changes in the own wage and the 
wage of the other worker on the effort decision, that is, it allows to observe the whole wage 
effort function ei(wi, wj) at an individual level. After workers have decided on their efforts for 
all  possible  contingencies,  payoffs  are  calculated  given  the  actual  wages  the  employers 
decided to pay. Unlike in Study 1, subjects play the game only once in this study.  
The strategy method is cognitively more demanding than the direct response mode since 
the subjects have to take choices for all possible situations. Therefore, we took great care to 
explain the procedure in detail. Like in the previous study subjects had access to the ‘What if’ 
calculator. In some of the experimental sessions the subjects in the role of the employer were 
asked to fill in the same 3×3 matrix as the workers. There they should enter their expectations 
about the wage effort function of the workers. This was done after they had chosen their 
wages, but before they were informed about the outcome of the game. We will use these data 
to discuss the robustness of our findings. 
Results 
We  ran  twelve  sessions  and  observe  185  individual  wage effort  functions.  Like  in 
Study 1 employees on average reacted clearly positively to their own wage.
9 At the lowest 
wage, employees chose an effort of 1.4, at the intermediate wage the average effort was 5.0, 
and the high wage resulted in an average effort of 9.1 (see Figure 2). Forty seven of the 185 
employees (25 percent) chose the own payoff maximizing strategy (minimal effort in all nine 
cases).  A  majority  of  the  employees  (121  subjects,  or  65  percent)  chose  a  consistently 
reciprocal pattern, that is, given wj, an increase of wi led to weakly higher efforts. Most of the 
                                                 
9 Wages were similar as in Study 1: In 33 percent of the cases employers chose (10; 10); symmetric non minimal 
wages were chosen in 27 percent for (100;100) and 9 percent for (200; 200) of the cases. Unequal wages were 
paid in 14 percent (10; 100 or vice versa); in 2 percent (10; 200) and in 15 percent (100; 200) of the cases. 
Again, once an employer chose to pay at least one non minimal wage, unequal wages are observed in about half 
of the cases (47 percent).  
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remaining  employees  chose  some  non monotonic  strategy,  while  one  employee  chose  a 
decreasing pattern.  
Figure 2 uses the same structure as Figure 1 to illustrate average efforts at any given 
wage distribution. Here we do not display the number of observations because the strategy 
method gives us all 185 individual decisions for all wage combinations. For comparison we 
show the results of Study 1 by small dots. The overall degree of reciprocity towards the 
employer seems to be quite similar when we consider the low and the intermediate wage. For 
high  wages  (wi = 200)  we  cannot  confirm  the  large  variation  in  the  co workers’  effort 
observed in the direct response version of the game from Study 1. At least for the two lower 
wage levels, where the vast majority of observations from Study 1 stem, the two elicitation 
methods seem to produce very similar results. This supports the conclusion of a recent review 
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Figure 2: The average wage effort function of all employees (n = 185). 
Percentage numbers below the figure show for all wage combinations the 
percentage of subjects with minimal effort among all subjects who at least 
once chose non minimal effort (n = 138). 
Concerning the most interesting case where employee i earns the intermediate wage we 
now observe an inverted u shaped influence of the co worker’s wage. Efforts were highest 
when  both  employees  earned  the  intermediate  wage,  decreased  somewhat  (by  0.22  effort 
units) when the other worker earned less and decreased more than twice as much (by 0.58 
effort units) when the other worker earned more than worker i. This latter effect is highly 
significant (z = 3.763, p = .000, n = 185, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test). All other 
comparisons of line connected dots in Figure 2 are insignificant with p > .122.  
While the size of the wage comparison effect at the intermediate wage does not seem to be 
large (relative to reactions to changes in the worker's own wage) it is still a clear indication  
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that,  on  average,  people  react  negatively  to  disadvantageous  wage  discrimination.  The 
comparison to the data from Study 1 suggests that average reactions to disadvantageous wage 
discrimination might be underestimated in Study 2 due to the use of the strategy method.  
This result supports the existence of wage comparison effects in case of disadvantageous 
wage  inequality.  Recall  that  the  significant  effort  differential  is  the  only  case  where  an 
employee  can  react  to  disadvantageous  wage  inequality.  There  are  two  other  wage 
combinations  where  an  employee  is  also  in  a  disadvantageous  situation,  namely 
(wi,wj) = (10,100) and (10,200). However, even among the employees who chose non minimal 
effort in at least one situation the vast majority (79 percent) could not lower the effort in this 
situation since they chose minimal effort already in the (10,10) situation. The percentage 
number of subjects who chose minimal effort in a particular situation is indicated on the 
bottom line in Figure 2 (the 25 percent of subjects who always chose minimal effort are 
excluded). Here we see further support for the notion that being put in the disadvantageous 
situation influences the effort decision. The percentage number of employees choosing the 
lowest possible effort increased from 5 to 12 percent. This change is significant at p = .007 
(McNemar  test).  In  the  domains  of  advantageous  wage  discrimination,  where  employee i 
earns more than employee j, wage comparison effects are absent on average.  
Heterogeneity 
The average wage effort function shows evidence for wage comparison effects in the 
domain of disadvantageous wage inequality. In the domain of advantageous inequality, wage 
comparison effects do not seem to matter. However it might be the case that the average 
wage effort function hides interesting individual heterogeneity. This is in fact the case.  
Among  our  185  employees  47  (25  percent)  chose  minimal  effort  in  all  nine  wage 
combinations.  For  these  people  own payoff  maximization  apparently  dominates  any 
reciprocity or wage comparison effects.  For the following analysis we therefore consider only 
the 138 observations with at least one non minimal effort choice. We distinguish between 
four different patterns: (i) 20 percent of the employees do not differentiate their effort when 
the other employee’s wage changes. We call this type of employee the Unconcerned. (ii) 
Fourteen percent of the employees seem to reward their employer for a generous wage policy 
towards the other employee, that is, their effort is weakly increasing in wj. We call this type of 
behavior Altruistic. (iii) As an opposite reaction to altruism we have employees who (weakly) 
decrease their effort with higher co worker’s wages. The 28 percent of the employees who 
exhibit such a pattern are called Envious. These three types account for 62 percent of the 
observations.  
Among the remaining observations many show a hump shaped pattern at a wage of 100. 
Such a pattern can be interpreted as a preference for equal wages. An employee who, given 
the own wage, chooses a weakly higher effort in situations where the other employee has the 
same income is classified as Equity oriented. Ten percent of our observations follow this  
  13 
pattern.
10 The remaining 28 percent of the observations show different patterns.
11 Figure 3 
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Figure 3: Average wage effort function of the four types of employees’ behavior with some non 
minimal efforts across different wage combinations.  
 
                                                 
10 Note that the definitions Equity oriented, and either Envious or Altruistic are not mutually exclusive. Our 
classification scheme favors Envious or Altruistic over Equity oriented. If we would favor the Equity oriented 
classification over the other two we could classify 16 percent of our observations as Equity oriented. 
11 When introducing a large number of types there is a potential danger of classifying noise into categories. We 
check  whether  the  distribution  of  types  observed  in  our  experiment  is  systematic  by  comparing  it  to  the 
distribution of types generated by random wage effort functions. If we assume that efforts are chosen randomly 
the observed distribution of types is trivially different from randomly generated types due to the fact that in the 
latter case Unconcerned occur with virtually zero probability (.05
2)
3≈0.000. In a less restrictive scenario we 
allow  for  a  systematic  increase  of  effort  in  wi.  We  assume  that  each  worker  chooses  some  intermediate  ei 
whenever wj=100 and then randomly decides to increase, decrease or leave unchanged the effort for every 
change in wj with equal probability. Also in such a simulation the probability of observing an Unconcerned is 
very small (p=((⅓)
2)
3≈.0014, which is still an order of magnitude away from what we observe in our experiment. 
A χ
2 test of the simulated against the observed distribution of types yields p=.000, thus our wage comparison 
effects are clearly not random.  
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The pie diagram shows the fraction of employees who chose a wage effort function of the 
respective type. Interestingly, the average reaction to changes in an employee’s own wage is 
very similar across the four types. This can be confirmed when comparing the average effort 
increase  connected  with  an  increase  of  the  own  wage.  The  hypothesis  that  the  average 
increase in effort of all four types stem from the same distribution cannot be refuted (p = .471 
for the step from wi = 10 to 100 and p = .500 for 100 to 200, Kruskal Wallis tests). 
Strength of wage comparisons 
Our analysis thus far showed that a majority of our subjects who at least once chose a non 
minimal effort reacted in some way to the other worker's wage. Since the strategy method 
allows  us  to  observe  a  complete  wage effort  function  for  each  individual  we  can  also 
investigate how important, on average, reactions to own wages are relative to reactions to 
wage inequality. We calculate for both wages the average absolute reaction to ceteris paribus 
changes in wage. 
Figure  4  shows  how  the  two  effects  compare  in  strength.  The  size  of  bubbles  is 
proportional to the number of underlying individuals. On the horizontal axis we denote the 
average reaction to a worker's own wage. On the vertical axis we depict the average reaction 
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Figure 4: Bubble plot of the intensity of the reaction to the own 
wage and to the wage of the other worker. The thin line is the 45 
degree line, the thick line is the OLS regression line. 
Figure 4 shows that almost all observations are below the 45 degree line, that is, the 
reaction to changes in a worker's own wage are stronger than reactions to the changes in the 
co worker's wage. A few observations are on the x axis, that is, these subjects only react to 
their  own  wage  but  not  at  all  to  the  wage  received  by  the  co worker.  There  is  also  a 
substantial number of observations at 0 0. These subjects react neither to their own wage nor 
to their co worker’s wage.   
  15 
The thick line depicts an OLS regression line, which indicates that reactions to wi and wj 
are positively correlated. The slope is.19 (p = .000), which shows that on average reactions to 
the co worker’s wage are one fifth of the average reaction to own wage.  
 
Robustness 
For a subset of subjects in the role of the employer we elicited their expectations about an 
employee’s wage effort function. After they had chosen their wages we informed them that 
the experiment was over but asked them to fill in the same 3×3 matrix used for the employees. 
They  were  asked  to  indicate  how  they  think  an  employee  would  react  to  different  wage 
combinations. Subjects were informed that the answer to this question was not relevant for 
their  payoff.  Subjects  entered  their  expectations  before  they  learned  the  outcome  of  the 
game.
12 
We use these expectations data as a robustness check for our results. Figure 5 shows the 
average expectation about the employees’ effort for all nine wage combinations. The thin 
lines show the decisions of the 185 employees observed in our experiment. Our expectations 
data  from  75  employers  presents  a  very  similar  pattern  as  that  of  the  actual  efforts.  In 
particular, employers anticipated the asymmetric reaction to wage inequality: like in Figure 2 
we  find  a  significant  drop  in  effort  in  case  of  disadvantageous  wage  inequality  at  the 
intermediate wage and no systematic effects in case of advantageous wage inequality. At 
intermediate wages the employers’ expectations about the effort level are surprisingly close to 
the actual efforts, while for high wages employers tend to underestimate the reciprocity of the 
workers. However, the difference is not significant.
13  
Apart from average efforts we also observe quite similar heterogeneity of patterns in our 
expectations  data.  Among  the  employers  27  percent  entered  minimal  effort  for  all  wage 
combinations  while  in  the  actual  decisions  we  observed  25  percent  money  maximizing 
behavior. In case of the wage effort functions with non minimal efforts we observe some 
differences between expectations and decision data. In the expectations data the frequency of 
Unconcerned and Altruistic is seven percent and thus lower than in the decision data. The 
Envious type is expected to occur in 38 percent (compared to 28 percent in employees’ actual 
decisions). The Equity oriented type is with 13 percent slightly more frequent and a relatively 
large portion of the data could not be classified (35 percent, compared to 28 percent in the 
decision data).
14 These differences are weakly significant (Pearson χ
2(4) = 8.021. p = 0.091). 
                                                 
12 Note that we did not ask them about their belief about their employee's efforts for the wages they actually paid. 
We did this deliberately in order to avoid problems of aggregating the wage effort combinations of the two 
employees to a single belief. For beliefs it would make sense to think about the average wage effort function. 
Our method puts employers in the shoes of an employee and gives an account for their expectation about what an 
employee would do in this situation. 
13 We compare the average effort at wi = 200 using a two sample Wilcoxon rank sum test: z = 1.22, p = .222. 
14 This is not surprising given that the expectations elicitation was done without financial incentives. It is often 
observed that not paying the subjects increases variance in the data (see Smith and Walker (1993); Gächter and 
Renner (2006)).   
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The results of Study 2 confirm the results of Study 1 in showing that there are significant 
wage comparison effects in the domain of disadvantageous wage discrimination. Consistent 
with the fair wage effort hypothesis employees tend to reduce their effort when they are paid 
less than their co worker but no equivalent effect is observed for overpayment. These average 
effects mask a surprisingly large variety of different patterns of wage comparison effects. 
Some workers seem to reward the employer for a generous wage for the co worker, others do 
the opposite. These opposite sort of reactions can explain why on average wage comparison 
effects appear to be weak when in fact they are quite strong.  
Why do we observe these wage comparison effects? In particular, what is the role of 
payoff differences relative to intentional wage discrimination, for wage comparison effects? 
Our Study 3 will address this question.  
 
V. Study 3: The role of intentional wage discrimination for wage comparison effects 
The goal of this study is to check whether the effort reducing effect of disadvantageous 
wage  inequality  stems  from  aversion  against  intentional  discrimination.  Experimental  and 
theoretical research on social preferences suggests that in addition to payoff comparisons 
intentions play a substantial role (e.g., Blount (1995); Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2000); 
Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003); Charness (2004); Falk and Fischbacher (2006); Falk, et al. 
(2008)). Therefore, effort reactions might be different if the resulting wage offers do not arise 
from the deliberate choice of the employer.  
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We ran three additional sessions with a non intentional variant of our three person gift 
exchange games. The experiment is exactly the same as in Study 2 with the exception that the 
employer does not choose the wages. Instead, a random device chooses the two wages on 
behalf  of  the  employer,  who  does  not  take  any  decision  (for  similar  designs  see  Blount 
(1995), Charness (2004), and Falk, et al. (2008)). The probabilities for each of the nine wage 
combinations are chosen to match the frequencies of wage offerings observed in Study 2. All 
subjects were informed about this procedure. 
What  should  we  expect  from  such  a  Non intentional  treatment?  Workers  presumably 
choose lower efforts in the case of disadvantageous wage inequality in order to express their 
discontent with the situation. If the employer is not responsible for wage inequality, there is 
no reason to punish him for unequal wages. We therefore expect the wage comparison effects 
to disappear in the experiments of Study 3. We also expect a reduced own wage effect, in 
particular  for  non minimal  wages,  because  attributed  kindness,  in  addition  to  payoff 
comparisons has been shown to be important in gift exchange (Charness (2004); Falk and 
Fischbacher (2006)). 
Results 
We observe the wage effort functions of 70 employees. Figure 6 shows the average wage 
effort function of the Non intentional treatments. For comparison we also show the results 
from Study 2. Similar to Charness (2004) we find that removing the 'intentionality' behind the 
wage offer reduces the strength of the reaction to wage changes. Low wages induce slightly 
higher efforts and high wages induce lower efforts relative to the case with intentional wage 
offers. Especially in the latter case our data shows stronger effects between the Intentional 
and the Non intentional treatment than those found by Charness (2004). The average effort in 
all nine wage combinations is 5.2 in Intentional versus 3.9 in Non intentional. This difference 
is highly significant.
15  
                                                 
15 A two sample Wilcoxon rank sum test returns p = .002. This is partly due to the fact that a higher fraction of 
the subjects (37 percent) chose minimal effort in all nine wage combinations. In Study 2 we observed 25 percent. 
The difference is weakly significant by a two sided Fisher exact test (p = .087). However, even if we consider 
only the subjects with at least one non minimal effort the difference between the two treatments in average 
efforts remains significant with p = .005.  
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Figure  6:  Average  wage effort  function  in  the  Non intentional 
treatments of Study 3 and the results of Study 2 for comparison.  
 
The drop in efforts in case of disadvantageous wage inequality at intermediate wages 
disappears  almost  entirely.  The  tiny  drop  of  .07  effort  units  is  insignificant  and  so  is  a 
McNemar’s  test  for  the  probability  of  choosing  a  minimal  effort  between  the 
(wi,wj) = (100,100) and (100,200) situation. All differences between the line connected dots in 
Figure  6  are  insignificant  at  p > .138,  with  the  exception  of  the  increase  between 
(wi,wj) = (200,10) and (200,100). This comparison is significant at p = .043. Thus, removing 
the  intentional  aspect  of  disadvantageous  wage  discrimination  does  eliminate  its  effort 
reducing effects.  
This observation is also supported by the employers’ expectations in the Non intentional 
treatments (not shown in Figure 6). Average expected effort is with 5.0 in the (100,200) 
situation even slightly higher than in (100,100) with 4.9.  
Heterogeneity 
The fact that wage comparison effects disappear for the intermediate wage suggest that the 
change from the intentional to the non intentional treatment also affects the distribution of 
types in the population. Figure 7 shows the percentage of each type of wage effort function in 
the  Intentional  and  Non intentional  treatment.  Unlike  in  Figure  3  we  now  include 
observations from subjects choosing minimal effort in all nine situations, and coin them as 
Egoistical. Given that average efforts in Non intentional were substantially below average 
efforts in Intentional it is not surprising that the percentage of Egoistical patterns is much 
larger in the former. Removing intentional wage payments leads to an increase in Altruistic 
types  (from  11  to  14  percent).  The  other  three  types  occur  less  frequently.  Especially 
pronounced is the drop in Envious types (21 percent to 9 percent).   
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Figure 7: Average wage effort function in the Non intentional treatments 
of Study 3 and the results of Study 2 for comparison.  
 
Overall the differences in the distribution of types is only weakly significant (Pearson 
χ
2(5) = 9.69,  p = .085).  However,  if  we  focus  on  two  specific  types  where  workers 
systematically punish the employer for disadvantageous wage inequality (Envious and Equity 
oriented) we observe a combined drop from 29 percent to 15 percent when intentions are 
removed.  If  we  test  these  two  types  against  the  remaining  observations  we  observe  a 
significant difference (χ
2(1) = 5.27. p = 0.022). This clearly indicates that if we remove the 
intentionality behind wage discrimination the adverse effect of the co worker's wage on a 
worker's effort is substantially reduced.  
Discussion 
The results of Study 3 show that it is rather the intentional aspect of wage discrimination 
that produces the effort reduction in case of disadvantageous wage discrimination and not 
pure payoff comparisons. On the other hand, when wage inequality is non intentional, we 
observe  slightly  more  Altruistic  types,  indicating  that  workers  tend  to  compensate  the 
employer not only for generous own wages but also for generous co worker's wages. This 
makes  sense  if  the  driving  force  behind  wage  comparison  effects  is  interdependent 
preferences (Sobel (2005)). For the Intentional treatments observed behavior is likely to be 
explained by a mix of interdependent preferences and reciprocal motives, leading to much 
more adverse reactions to unfavorable wage discrimination.
16 
We conclude that randomly generated wage discrimination does not systematically affect 
work  morale.  However,  consistent  with  previous  evidence  (e.g.,  Charness  (2004))  payoff 
concerns do matter with regard to own wages – higher wages induce higher efforts, although 
at a lower level than in the intentional treatment of Study 2. 
                                                 
16 Pure reciprocity models like Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) cannot explain wage comparison effects due 
to the fact that the kindness terms in these models solely depend on a worker's own (hypothetical) income. 
Explaining wage comparison effects would require a kindness dependent on how the employer treats the other 
worker. See Thöni (2009) for details.  
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VI. Concluding remarks 
The results from laboratory experiments reported in this paper support the view that wage 
comparison is an important determinant for a worker's effort decision. We find strong wage 
comparison effects both in the three person gift exchange game in the direct response mode 
(Study  1)  and  when  we  use  the  strategy  method  (Study  2).  Consistent  with  Akerlof  and 
Yellen's fair wage effort hypothesis (Akerlof and Yellen (1990)) we observe in both Study 1 
and Study 2 that paying a worker less than his co worker leads to a decrease in effort relative 
to a situation with equal wages. Paying a worker more than a co worker does not increase 
effort levels on average. Study 3 revealed that the overall wage comparison effects are due to 
an  aversion  against  intentional  wage  discrimination,  and  not  due  to  resulting  payoff 
differences.  
A main result of our paper is that there is a large degree of individual heterogeneity in our 
data. We observe several patterns: some workers do not react at all to changes in the co 
worker's wage, some increase or decrease their effort for changes in the co worker's wage, 
and a fourth category chooses highest effort whenever the two wages are equal. Despite the 
high degree of heterogeneity, the observed wage comparison effects are clearly not random. 
In  the  case  of  advantageous  wage  discrimination  the  heterogeneous  effects  seem  to 
counterbalance each other, leading to no systematic overall effect. In case of disadvantageous 
wage inequality the overall effect is clearly negative. 
We see our experiment as a test for the existence of wage comparison effects: subjects in 
the role of the worker have no information about the reasons for wage discrimination and they 
take  their  decision  under  anonymity.  We  conjecture that  our  laboratory  measure  of wage 
comparison effects is a lower bound for the importance of wage comparison effects. This 
conclusion is suggested by a recent field experiment by Cohn, Fehr, Herrmann and Schneider 
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Appendix 
[In the following we will present all information subjects received during the experiment.  We will show the information in 
the order the subjects received them.  Editorial comments like this one are added in squared brackets.] 
[First the subjects are welcomed orally outside the laboratory.  After some introductory comments the subjects draw a card 
that assigns them randomly to one of the computer terminals.  There they find the following written instructions:] 
 
Instructions: 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment that has been financed by various foundations for research promotion. If 
you read the following instructions carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn a considerable amount of money. 
It is therefore very important to read these instructions with care. 
The instructions that we have distributed to you are solely for your private information. It is prohibited to communicate with 
the other participants during the experiment.  Should you have any questions please contact us. If you violate this rule, we 
shall have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments. 
During the experiment your income will be calculated in points.  You will receive an initial endowment of 400 points. It is 
possible that some decisions will result in losses.  The points you lose will be subtracted from your endowment.  
At the end of the experiment we will convert your point income to Francs at the following rate: 
1 Point = 3 Rappen. 
Your income will be paid out to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
1. Introduction 
In this experiment you will be matched with two other participants to a group of three persons.  In the following the three 
persons will be called either “buyer” or “seller”.  In each group there will be one buyer and two sellers.  At the beginning 
of the experiment you will be informed by the computer about whether you are a buyer or a seller. 
The determination of your role and the group you are in is random.  Neither during the experiment nor after the experiment 
you will be informed about the composition of your group, i.e., all your decisions are taken anonymously. 
 
2. An Overview 
The buyer has a separate contract with each of the to sellers as shown in the following figure: 
 
 
  BUYER 
SELLER 1  SELLER 2 
Contract 1  Contract 2 
Price1  Price2 
Quality1  Quality2 
 
 
In the first stage the buyer has to choose the prices he wants to pay to the two sellers.  The sellers then choose the quality of 
the fictive product.  A higher quality means higher production cost for the seller.  On the other hand, the higher the quality of 
the product the higher is the income of the buyer.   
 
The experiment has two stages: 
1. The buyer chooses the price he wants to pay for the product for each of the two sellers.  There are three possible prices that 
can be chosen.  The possible prices are 10, 100, or 200. 
2. The sellers choose the quality of their product.  The quality of the product is represented by a number between 1 and 20. 
The experiment is conducted only once. 
 
3. The Calculation of the Incomes 
When  the  buyer  has  chosen  the  two  prices  and  the  buyers  have  chosen  their  qualities  then  the  incomes  of  the  three 
participants of a group can be calculated.  The calculation is as follows: 
Buyer 
The buyer receives revenue from the qualities the two sellers (1 and 2) have chosen. This revenue is 18 times the chosen 
quality in both contracts.  From this revenue we have to subtract the two prices that the buyer pays.  His income is therefore: 
 
Income Buyer = 18 * (Quality1 + Quality2) – Price1 – Price2  
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The income of the buyer increases with higher quality of the two products.  The prices he pays for the two products are 
subtracted from his income. 
Seller 1 
The income of Seller 1 depends on the price he receives from the buyer.  From this price we subtract the costs of the provided 
quality.  These costs depend on the provided quality.  For each additional unit of quality the costs are 7 points.  The minimum 
quality of 1 has no costs.  Therefore the costs of the quality are calculated as 7 * (Quality – 1).  The income of Seller 1 is 
calculated as: 
 
Income Seller 1 = Price1 – 7 * (Quality1 – 1) 
 
The income of the seller only depends on his price and his quality.  The higher the price the higher is his income. The higher 
the quality he chooses the lower is his income. 
Seller 2 
The income of Seller 2 is calculated exactly the same way as the income of Seller 1, except that, of course, the price and the 
quality of contract 2 enter the formula: 
 
Income Seller 2 = Price2 – 7 * (Quality2 – 1) 
 
 
The calculation of the incomes will be shown with a hypothetical example: 
 
Hypothetical example for demonstration purposes 
Assume that the buyer chooses the following prices for his sellers: 
Price for Seller 1 = 100 
Price for Seller 2 = 10 
The sellers choose the following qualities: 
Quality Seller 1 = 9 
Quality Seller 2 = 1 
This situation results in the following incomes: 
Income Buyer: The buyer receives 18 * (9 + 1) = 180 and pays a total of 110 to the sellers.  
The income of the buyer is 180 – 110 = 70. 
Income Seller 1: Seller 1 receives a price of 100.  The quality of 9 costs (9 – 1) * 7 = 56. 
The income of Seller 1 is: 100 – 56 = 44. 
Income Seller 2: Seller 2 receives a price of 10.  The quality of 1 costs (1 – 1) * 7 = 0. 
The income of Seller 2 is: 10 – 0 = 10. 
 
When the experiment starts you will be informed about whether you are a seller or a buyer in this experiment.  When you 
press the “continue” button a screen with control questions will appear.  Here you will find a “What if calculator”.  With this 
calculator you can try out different combinations of prices and qualities and calculate the resulting incomes.  In the right 
panel of the screen you find the control questions.  Here you have to calculate the incomes of all members of your group for 
four hypothetical situations.  Press “Check” when you have completed the table.  You will then be informed about whether 
your solution was correct. 
It is important to note that all calculations you do with the “What if calculator” have no influence on the experiment and on 
the payments you will receive at the end of the experiment.  The calculations are solely for your information. 
When you have solved all control questions correctly you will be guided to the next screen where you have to make your 
decisions.  Depending on whether you are a buyer or a seller you will have to choose two prices or a quality.  In the screen 
where you enter your decisions you will again have the possibility to use the “What if calculator”. 
Do you have any further questions? 
[End of the written instructions. The subjects are then shown an introductory screen on the computer where they learn their 
type.  The screen contains the following information:] 
 
Welcome to the experiment 
In this experiment you are in the role of a Seller [Buyer]. 
In the next screen you will be given some time to get used to the income calculation rules of this experiment. You will have 
to solve some control questions.    
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The purpose of the control questions is to test whether you have understood the calculation of the incomes of this experiment.  
Your answers do not have any influence on the experiment itself or on the payment you will receive at the end of the 
experiment. 
[The next screen contains the “What if calculator” and four hypothetical plays of the game.  The screenshot below shows the 
seller’s screen.  The buyer’s screen differed slightly such that the subject’s own income was always on the rightmost column 




[When the subjects succeed in answering the control questions they proceed to the next screen containing the following 
information:] 
In the next screen you will have to enter your decisions.  You still have access to the “What if calculator” where you can try 
out different combinations of prices and qualities before you make your final decision. 
[The sellers’ screen provides additional information:] 
The buyer in your group will choose his prices at the same time as you choose your quality.  Therefore, you cannot know 
which price you will receive. 
Since you do not know which price your buyer chooses, you will have to indicate your quality decision for each possible 
combination of your price and the price that the other seller in your group receives.   
In the screen where you have to enter your decision you will be shown a table such as the one below. For each of the nine 
possible  combinations  in  this  table  you  have  to  enter  the  quality  (from  1  to  20)  you  want  to  choose  in  the 
corresponding situation. 
When you have completed the table and your buyer has chosen the prices then the computer will calculate the incomes with 
your quality according to the table.  One of the numbers in the nine fields of the table will be the decisive quality for the 
calculation of the incomes. 
 
  Suppose the price for 
the other seller is:  10 
Suppose the price for 
the other seller is:  100 
Suppose the price for 
the other seller is:  200 
Suppose the price 
for you is:  10 
Here you have to 
enter the your quality  Y   
Suppose the price 
for you is:  100 
     
Suppose the price 
for you is:  200 
  X   
 
How to fill in the form: If you choose a quality of X in the situation where you receive a price of 200 and the other seller in 
your group receives a price of 100 then you have to enter X in the corresponding field (see the X in the table above). 
 
Example for the income calculation: If your buyer chooses a price of 10 for you and a price of 100 for the other seller, then 
the incomes will be calculated with the quality you entered in the field marked by Y.  
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Please report to us if something remains unclear.  Otherwise, please press “continue”. 
[On the next screen the subjects have to make their decision.  There is no explicit time limit.  However, at the time most of 
the subjects have taken their decision we ask publicly to finish the decisions within the next 2 to 3 minutes.  Below we show 
the input screen for the sellers.  The left part of the screen is very similar in the buyers’ screen. On the right side, the buyers 




[After having entered their two prices we ask them about their expectations.  The buyers receive the following information:] 
You have just chosen your prices.  The experiment is therefore over for you.  However, in the following we will ask you to 
answer a question.  The answer on the question has no impact on your payoff in the experiment. 
The question goes like this: What do you think the reaction of the sellers to different prices looks like?  What quality will a 
seller choose if, e.g. he receives a price of 100 and the other seller receives a price of 10?  What quality will he choose if both 
sellers receive a price of 100? 
There are 9 different combinations of the two prices.  In the next screen you should indicate which quality you think a seller 
will choose for all 9 combinations of the two prices.  (Please note: You should not indicate the quality that you think is right 
from a moralistic point of view or the quality that you would like the sellers to choose.  Instead, you should try to guess the 
quality that a seller will eventually choose. 
[After having read this information the buyers see a screen where they can fill in the 3 x 3 matrix.  The screen looks similar to 
the seller’s screen shown above.  When all buyers and sellers have completed their entries the experiment ends.] 
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